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Attempts in formalising law have shown that judging and legal reasoning goes 
beyond the mere knowledge of the substance of law and direct application of 
the rules.1 Geoffrey Samuel in his textbook Short Introduction to Judging and to 
Legal Reasoning2 has successfully captured some of the core ideas of judging 
and legal reasoning throughout time. Starting the journey at the point where 
legal reasoning initiated – Ancient Roman times where judges used bottom-
up methods to reason from practical cases by applying the rules and focused 
on the actions - the author guides the reader to the modern days, where legal 
reasoners are expected to perform increasingly complex analyses and balance 
various interests at stake, incorporating a mix of the past legacy and new 
analytical methods. 
There is a vast literature covering the topic of judging and legal reasoning 
from various perspectives.3 Samuel masterfully constructs a web tying these 
distinct approaches together to show a more holistic view of legal reasoning. 
In comparison with some other textbooks in the field, this book has the 
advantage of capturing several centuries worth of work into a well-written 
guide, avoiding unnecessary verbiage. The author is inspired by Mitchel 
Lasser's4 analysis and presents his account through a contrast between the so-
called 'official portrait' and the 'unofficial portrait' of legal reasoning. This 
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comparison provides a helpful approach for law students at their early stages 
to contextualise some of the abstract ideas of legal theory and provides real 
life examples from legal practice.  
The overall goal of the book is to provide the reader with the essential skills 
and knowledge base to understand what it means to reach a legal decision, 
and what tools and reasoning methods the judge can employ to justify such 
decisions. It asks for instance, 'to what extent is judging and legal reasoning 
guided or influenced by particular theories about law and legal knowledge' or 
'does the judge simply apply the code to the circumstances or does the legal 
decision making involve more complex reasoning levels?'.5 While the author 
manages to answer only some of the questions posed, he enables the reader 
to consider these questions seriously by providing a well-curated source of 
reference.  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK  
The book is divided into two parts: firstly, introducing the reader to what 
judging and legal reasoning has been in the past, and, secondly, providing an 
original analysis of the dichotomy of the views of the current state of the 
matters in this area of legal theory. The book is thoughtfully designed to 
encourage the readers to familiarise themselves with some of the original 
texts and cases. Such an exercise allows the reader to understand both the 
concepts and substance of the relevant law.  
In the first part, the author walks the reader through the historical 
developments of judging and legal reasoning, starting from the early Roman 
law and leading up to the modern interpretation methods.6 The author shows 
how the legal thought has changed through the years by presenting the 
prominent methods dominating the field, and emphasising what has been 
understood as the subject of the law. There is a great effort of revealing the 
true complexity of the law, for instance, by showing that there is no single 
correct way of interpreting statutes in all legal situations.7  
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The second part of the book introduces and compares the official and 
unofficial portraits of judging and legal reasoning. The official portrait 
presents judging and legal reasoning from the insider's perspective, 
protecting the values that are important to law and those that are shown 
through legal education and legal decision-making. The unofficial portrait 
focuses on an external view on legal reasoning that, in Samuel's book, has 
been taken from social sciences and film studies. There is an overlap between 
the two. However, it is clear that both portraits are applicable to different 
contexts, and that neither of them is able to illustrate the full complexity of 
legal reasoning and decision making.  
The author has chosen two characteristics that accommodate the 
comparison between the official and unofficial portraits – the level of 
observation and the type of analysis applied to the approaches. Firstly, 
Samuel discusses the differences between analysing law from internal and 
external perspectives. The official portrait is intended to present the internal 
views of the judges as they believe legal reasoning is and should be. It shows a 
formal view of the matters. In contrast, the unofficial view is represented by 
the social scientists who would analyse the law from an external point of view 
and consider what can be observed in reality.  
More interestingly, the second level of comparison is based on the type of 
analysis performed in each of the portraits. The official portrait is linked with 
the authority paradigm, which emphasises the importance of respecting the 
order and rules, and focuses on interpretation instead of criticising the 
current system. The unofficial portrait uses the inquiry paradigm, which is a 
common approach in the natural sciences, looking for the explanation of the 
phenomenon observed, and take the system of law as the observable. Both 
sets of approaches face certain challenges in explaining judging and legal 
reasoning. For instance, they reveal the difficulties of the internal 
justification of the judge's decision-making in an objective manner.  
Lastly, introducing some less traditional approaches, Samuel has chosen to 
present in a novel way how some ideas from film studies can be applied as 
useful tools for analysis. Despite the fact that law has usually been associated 
with text-based reasoning, he argues that legal knowledge also deals with non-
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written expressions employing visual associations.8 For instance, he uses an 
example of deploying metaphors in the court that would paint a picture that 
abstracts from the particular case, and, thus, allows the reasoners to model 
the rules and facts in a new way.  
II. DISCUSSION  
There are four points that I would like to contribute to the discussion here: 
firstly, I wish to present some additional interdisciplinary approaches that 
could have provided a better overview of the legal reasoning and decision-
making and that have been omitted by the author; secondly, I believe, there 
should have been more emphasis on the beginnings and developments of the 
formal approaches that have influenced a lot of the interdisciplinary work of 
law, logic and computing science conducted at the moment; thirdly, I will 
argue that there is a limited scope for the application of the representation 
theory and similar results could be achieved by or in collaboration with such 
alternatives as the linguistic analysis; and fourthly, I wish to add some further 
considerations about the future challenges of the judges and legal reasoners 
that could have benefited the final discussions in the book.  
1. Interdisciplinarity  
I believe that the picture drawn by the author of the legal reasoner and 
decision-maker could have been improved by considering a more diverse set 
of interdisciplinary fields. While the author focused on some 
interdisciplinary influences (theology, evidence studies) in understanding 
legal reasoning and legal decision-making, there are numerous other 
approaches that could have provided more insights to the readers. For 
instance, there has been a lot of work done to understand the mind of a judge 
from a medical perspective. Psychologists and neuroscientists have identified 
many weaknesses in human reasoning that judges are no exception to.9 These 
include biases, overreliance on expert opinions, limited ability to reason with 
numbers and statistical information. Another example can be shown through 
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the political analysis of legal judgements. Many agree that law and judges 
cannot be considered as completely independent from legislative and 
executive powers, as it is often influenced by the political views and policy 
matters, and also partly depends on the subjective beliefs of the reasoners. 
Such inconsistencies and subjectivity – in the author's words 'hunches'10 –are 
not represented in the official portrait of reasoning. Furthermore, natural 
sciences are commonly concerned with closed systems in which the 
phenomenon is explained. Law is fluid in its nature and does not easily 
accommodate formal proofs due to the complex subject matters that are 
embedded in a human made system.11 Some other fields that provide useful 
insights in the analysis of decision-making include economics, politics, 
linguistics, gender studies, anthropology, etc. At the same time, it is 
understandable that such endeavour might go beyond of what has been 
intended for this textbook.  
2. Formalism in the Past and Current Discussions 
In the first chapter, the author identified the beginnings of some of the 
formal methods in the law by explaining Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646 – 1716) and 
Christian Wolff's (1679 – 1754) mathematical approaches solving legal cases 
using deduction. It would have been useful to also mention John Henry 
Wigmore's (1863 – 1943) approach of legal reasoning charts formalising some 
parts of legal decision-making from facts. Nowadays, these ideas have 
regained their popularity among formalists with the raising interest in 
argumentation, automatization and artificial intelligence applied in the law.12 
A brief discussion of these approaches would have provided an additional 
layer of interdisciplinarity to the overview provided by the author, and 
introduced topics that might be omitted in some other law curriculum that is 
still mainly focused on classical approaches to the law. Furthermore, 
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exposure to the formal theories might reduce the remaining stigma against 
numbers and statistics in the courtrooms and legal discussions.13  
3. Representation Theory 
Samuel introduces the representation or image theory as one of the more 
modern alternatives to analysing law. It puts emphasis on the use of 
metaphors and characters to explain legal scenarios in different 
environments. In a way, the use of 'images' aims to simplify legal concepts and 
hypothetical scenarios to better explain them to both legal reasoners and 
layperson involved in the process of adjudication. However, the brief 
introduction of the representation theory does not yet justify its usefulness 
in legal analysis. The example given was based on case where the liability of 
the school on a field trip had to be decided. It showed the different ways 
opposing parties presented the contrast between persons (in this case, the 
school girls) and things (in this case, the zoo) by creating to different mental 
images justifying their decisions.14 I argue that such analysis could have also 
been presented through linguistic analysis that has already established links 
with legal reasoning.15 Law and language analysis focuses on the way legal 
reasoners understand and use language to express and justify their decisions. 
Linguistic analysis provides useful tools for the persona and res analysis that 
Samuel claims to be untangled by the representation theory. Indeed, for more 
convincing outcomes the representation theory could be closely linked with 
the language analysis of the judgements and other legal texts to provide a 
clearer understanding of the complex concepts used.  
4. The Future of Decision-Making  
The author mostly focused on the legacy of the past and the current 
approaches to judging and legal reasoning. The book would have benefited 
from a brief section on the future of decision-making and modern influences 
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in this field. I believe that with the legal rules and cases themselves becoming 
increasingly complex, it is the legal reasoners that are expected to cope with 
the changes and keep up with the time. The burden on judges are (at least) 
twofold. On the one hand, there is the substance argument, where the judges 
are expected to keep up with the current changes in the legal system that are 
becoming increasingly complex. Moreover, judges are required to have a 
comprehension of the increasingly technical facts of the case (statistical 
evidence, medical evidence, etc.). On the other hand, there is the (meta-) 
analytical argument of judges being criticised for not implementing newest 
methods of reasoning in their decision-making. As it was shown through the 
claims made in the official portrait, judges perceive legal reasoning from an 
internal point of view, and are not necessarily concerned with the external 
approaches. There is yet to come an internal or external theory that would 
seem attractive and efficient enough to be considered and implemented in 
the courts.  
One solution to alleviate the burden on judges, is to look at the tasks that are 
increasing in complexity but do not necessarily require a trained legal 
reasoner. For instance, in criminal law, it is common to rely on forensic 
evidence. With the techniques of forensic evidence developing due to new 
practices and technologies, the field itself has become far more advanced 
than, say, 20 years ago. Judges are not expected to become forensic specialists 
to be able to make a decision in a criminal case. Therefore, some changes in 
the ways the evidence is presented in the case, so that the judges (and possibly 
the jury) could have a better understanding of the facts presented and their 
impact to the case, is encouraged by the field specialists. However, there are 
many aspects of judging that have been described to be less technical and 
logical. Even though the robot judges might not be seen in the foreseeable 
future, there are many tasks in the law firms and courts that will no longer 
require a human input.16 
While automatization can provide many benefits, due to its early stages in 
development, it also poses some risks in legal decision making. It has already 
been shown that there is a tendency to misinterpret and overestimate the 
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importance of numeric data in the courtrooms.17 Furthermore, at this point 
it has not yet been decided as to who is to be held responsible if the algorithm 
becomes 'biased' towards a certain group of people. That is to show that due 
to the undefined nature of legal reasoning and decision-making, it is not yet 
possible to capture its essence in a single theory or programme.  
III. CONCLUSION 
This book is a good introductory level resource to any law student and any 
other curious mind interested in law and legal theory. It covers the basics of 
what both practitioners and academics understand as the exercise of 
decision-making and the processes of reaching legal conclusions. 
Connecting all these theories back to legal practice, I agree with the author 
that: 
which model dominates at any one moment will not be a matter either of 
correspondence or of the reliability of its coherent structure; it will be a 
matter of consent among those who make up the discipline of law.18  
To sum up, Samuel has created a concise guide to judging and to legal 
reasoning that will leave the reader with sufficient knowledge and wish to 
explore this area in more depth. Despite there being a number of fruitful 
approaches to judging and legal reasoning, each of which explains an aspect 
of legal reasoning, none of them is able to provide a full account of the 
phenomenon. The main lessons that can be learnt from this book are related 
to understanding the complex nature of legal decision-making and the 
burden that has been put on the judges when reaching legal conclusions. This 
book is recommended to law students and practitioners alike. 
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